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Cross-listings and corporate cash savings: International evidence 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper examines foreign firms that are cross-listed on the U.S. stock exchanges and finds 
that they exhibit higher cash savings sensitivity to stock price than their non-cross-listed 
counterparts. This finding is robust even after controlling for alternative regression specifications 
and samples, country-level institutional infrastructures, different listing types, and the 
endogeneity of the cross-listing decision. Further cross-sectional tests reveal that the increase in 
cash savings sensitivity to stock price is more pronounced for cross-listed firms with stock prices 
that are more informative, which is consistent with the influence of the managerial learning 
channel. The empirical evidence sheds more light on the implications of the cross-listing 
decision for international firms’ corporate cash management policies. 
 
 
JEL classification: G15; G31; G34 
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1.   Introduction 
 
Cross-listing and cash management are two important corporate decisions that managers of 
international firms must consider. The decision by an international firm to cross-list in the U.S. 
market could be rewarding due to the increased international visibility and recognition it 
provides, which would enhance the firm’s reputation and future growth prospects. Despite the 
numerous studies conducted in this area, no empirical study has examined the consequences of 
the cross-listing decision for international firms’ cash savings decisions. 
However, recent empirical studies provide evidence to suggest that the financial markets are 
not just a sideshow, but are relevant to firms’ corporate policies (Morck et al., 1990). In 
particular, stock prices contain information about future growth opportunities that is valuable for 
managers when they are making investment and cash savings decisions. For example, Chen et al. 
(2007) find that U.S. firms with stock prices that contain more private information make 
investments that are more sensitive to stock prices. In addition, Fresard (2012) demonstrates that 
when stock prices are more informative, firms’ cash savings exhibit higher sensitivities to stock 
prices. 
One important research question that arises from these two separate strands of literature is 
whether cross-listings can influence firms’ cash savings decisions. The main objective of this 
study is to examine the effect of cross-listing on the sensitivity of firms’ cash savings to stock 
price. The findings from recent studies suggest that cross-listings should result in an increase in 
cash savings sensitivity to stock price, as managers of the cross-listed firms are able to obtain 
more accurate information about the value of future investment opportunities.  
Using an international sample that covers 41 countries from 1983 to 2007, this study 
documents that cross-listed firms demonstrate higher cash savings sensitivity to stock price than 
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non-cross-listed firms by about 400%. The effect only exists after the firms are cross-listed and 
continue to be present three years after the cross-listing year. In addition, the magnitude and 
statistical significance of the results are not affected by changes in regression specifications, the 
use of different standard error clusters and alternative samples, or by controlling for endogeneity 
and self-selection bias using the instrumental variable (IV) estimation and Heckman’s (1979) 
correction model. Further investigation suggests that the positive relationship between cross-
listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price only exists for foreign firms that are cross-listed 
on the U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) and not for other types of cross-listings 
such as over-the-counter (OTC) or private placement (Rule 144A) listings. Moreover, the effect 
appears to be weaker after the implementation of SOX. 
The second objective of this paper is to compare explanations for the positive relationship 
between cross-listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price. The agency channel offers one 
plausible explanation. Prior cross-listing studies document that market segmentation and legal 
bonding are the two most relevant explanations of the cross-listing decision. One important 
finding is that managers of cross-listed firms have fewer tendencies to expropriate shareholders 
due to the stronger disclosure requirement of the cross-listing. As a result, strong legal protection 
through cross-listing helps to mitigate agency problems and decrease the problems of 
overinvestment and underinvestment. If this explanation is valid, an improvement in cash 
savings sensitivity to stock price should be more prominent for the sample of firms located in 
countries with weak investor protection, as these firms benefit the most from cross-listing. 
Access to external financing channels provides another explanation. Cross-listing is typically 
one important way through which foreign firms can alleviate the financing constraints they face 
in the home markets, and facilitates access to external financial markets to help these firms 
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finance their investment opportunities (Lins et al., 2005). If this explanation is valid, financially 
constrained firms can be expected to demonstrate a higher increase in cash savings sensitivity to 
stock price due to the cross-listing. 
The role of managerial learning in the corporate decisions made by managers in a cross-
listing environment provides the final explanation. Cross-listings have been documented to 
improve the informativeness of a firm’s stock price (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), allowing 
managers to obtain more precise information about the value of future growth opportunities. 
Therefore, for the managerial learning explanation to be valid, the positive relation between 
cross-listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price ought to be more pronounced for cross-
listed firms with more informative stock prices. 
To examine the validity of these three competing hypotheses, the sample is partitioned into 
subsamples based on firm-level measures of financial constraint (using changes in size and 
dividend payout ratio), firm-level measures of stock price informativeness (using analyst 
coverage and firm-specific return variation) and country-level institutional variables that proxy 
for access to external finance and investor protection. The results of cross-sectional tests reveal 
that the positive effect of cross-listing on the cash savings sensitivity to stock price is more 
prominent for cross-listed firms that are financially unconstrained and for firms in countries with 
strong investor protection. These empirical findings are contrary to expectations and rule out the 
possibility that they are driven by the agency channel or access to external financing channels.  
However, a striking difference is observed in the effect of cross-listing on the cash savings 
sensitivity to stock price for the two subsamples of cross-listed firms partitioned via firm-specific 
return variation and analyst coverage. In particular, the increase in cash savings sensitivity to 
stock price is driven by the sample of cross-listed firms with high firm-specific return variations 
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and low analyst coverage, which reinforces the role of managerial learning in explaining the 
positive relation between cross-listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price.  
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate over cross-listing and cash management policies 
in the international setting. The main results extend the literature related to the real effects of 
stock prices on firms’ corporate policies (see the recent survey by Bond et al., 2012). More 
importantly, cross-listing leads to an increase in the relationship between cash savings and stock 
price. This is achieved via the managerial learning mechanism, and corroborates the findings of 
several recent studies (Chen et al., 2007; Foucault and Fresard, 2012; Fresard, 2012). 
With the liberalization of international financial markets and the increasing disclosure 
requirement in the U.S. markets, the empirical findings of this study should partially address 
Karolyi’s (2006) concern on the “real economic consequences” of cross-listings and have 
important implications for the investment flows and capital allocations of cross-listed firms that 
in turn should affect the cash management policies of those firms. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature related to 
cross-listing and the relationship between cash savings and stock price, and develops two main 
hypotheses that link cross-listing decisions to the cash savings sensitivity to stock price out of the 
various competing explanations. Section 3 describes the cross-listing sample, main variables and 
research design used in the subsequent empirical tests. Section 4 presents and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes the paper. 
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2.  Hypothesis development 
Many studies have explored competing explanations for what compels foreign firms to cross-
list their stocks on the U.S. exchanges. The conventional view of the cross-listing decision arises 
from market segmentation, which limits the international flows of investment capital (Miller, 
1998). Foreign firms seek to overcome investment barriers by listing their stocks on the U.S. 
exchanges. The benefits these firms enjoy from cross-listing their stocks include improved 
access to external capital markets, a lower cost of capital, an expanded shareholder base, 
increased liquidity in trading and positive reputational effects.  
The bonding hypothesis was first introduced by Coffee (1999, 2002). He rationalizes that 
foreign firms decide to cross-list on the U.S. exchanges to commit managers to a stronger legal 
and regulatory regime. In a similar spirit, Stultz (1999) raises the issues of agency conflicts and 
information asymmetry and emphasizes the importance of corporate governance as one potential 
determinant of the cross-listings decision. A stronger corporate governance system limits 
managers’ consumption of the private benefits of control, which could be harmful to minority 
shareholders. As a result, cross-listings improve the information environment of foreign firms 
(Lang et al., 2003) and firm valuations (Doidge et al., 2004).  
Recent studies show that the stock market matters for investment and cash savings decisions. 
In particular, the theoretical models developed by Dow and Gorton (1997) and Subrahmanyam 
and Titman (1999) suggest that stock prices may offer some private information that managers 
are unaware of, as they reflect a collection of information from market participants such as 
traders and investors. Chen et al. (2007) find that managers rely on the private information in 
stock prices and incorporate it into their investment decisions, as stock price non-synchronicity 
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(1-R
2
) and the probability of informed trading (PIN) have positive effects on the sensitivity of 
investment to stock price.  
A recent theoretical paper by Foucault and Gehrig (2008) positions managerial learning as an 
alternative explanation of the cross-listing decision and derives important testable implications 
for the connection between cross-listings and the sensitivity of investment to stock price. 
Consistent with the finding of Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), they argue that stock prices are 
more informative for foreign firms that cross-list on the U.S. exchanges. This enables managers 
of cross-listed firms to obtain more accurate information about the value of their firms’ future 
growth prospects, which in turn influences their investment decisions. Therefore, one prediction 
of their model is that the sensitivity of investment to stock price should be larger for foreign 
firms that cross-list on the U.S. markets, as doing so enhances the stock price informativeness of 
a firm and thereby enables managers to acquire more precise information about the value of 
future growth opportunities. 
Foucault and Fresard (2012) find empirical support for Foucault and Gehrig’s (2008) 
theoretical prediction. In addition, Fresard (2012) documents that beyond investment decisions, 
cash savings decisions are positively associated with stock price. Moreover, the cash savings 
sensitivity to stock price is augmented for firms with more informative stock prices. The findings 
of Chen et al. (2007), Foucault and Fresard (2012) and Fresard (2012) demonstrate that financial 
markets are not just a sideshow but affect firms’ investment and cash savings decisions. More 
importantly, these studies highlight the role of managerial learning in firms’ real activities.  
The agency channel (McLean et al., 2012) and access to external financing channels (Baker 
et al., 2003) provide two other explanations. Cross-listing helps to mitigate the agency conflicts 
between corporate managers and minority shareholders by forcing managers to direct their 
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efforts toward investing in growing sectors and preventing them from overinvesting in declining 
sectors or engaging in dysfunctional behavior. Furthermore, cross-listed firms face fewer 
constraints in raising external funds to finance their investment projects.  
These three explanations suggest that the stock prices of cross-listed firms should reflect 
additional innovations in investment opportunities. This leads to the conjecture that cross-listed 
firms should exhibit higher cash savings sensitivity to stock price than non-cross-listed firms. 
H1. The cash savings of cross-listed firms are more sensitive to stock prices than those of 
non-cross-listed firms.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Fresard (2012) argues that the influence of stock price on cash savings 
decisions can be attributed to managerial learning. In other words, the increase in cash savings is 
more prominent if the stock prices reflect private information that is new to the managers. 
Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) show that cross-listing is positively related to the private 
information (measured using firm-specific return variation) contained in stock prices. Therefore, 
if the managerial learning channel is valid, the increase in cash savings sensitivity to stock price 
should be more pronounced for cross-listed firms with more informative stock prices. The stock 
prices subsequently convey more accurate signals about future growth opportunities, and 
managers can exploit this signal more effectively than firms with less-informative stock prices. 
This leads to the first part of the following second hypothesis. 
H2a. If the managerial learning channel is valid, the positive relationship between cross-
listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price should be more pronounced for firms with more 
informative stock prices. 
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As cross-listed firms are required to bind themselves to stricter disclosure requirements, 
their managers have less of an incentive to expropriate minority shareholders and help curb the 
problems associated with overinvestment and/or underinvestment. Moreover, the external capital 
markets are more accessible for cross-listed firms that wish to finance their investment projects. 
Based on these arguments, the positive relationship between cross-listing and cash savings 
sensitivity to stock price is expected to be more pronounced for financially constrained firms, 
firms located in countries where access to financing is more difficult and firms in countries with 
weak legal protection where more severe agency problems exist between managers and 
shareholders. Moreover, Lins et al. (2005) suggest that managers of firms in countries with low 
access to external financing can exploit an increase in growth opportunities due to the cross-
listing more effectively than managers of firms in countries with high access. This leads to the 
second part of the second hypothesis. 
H2b. If the agency or access to an external financing channel is valid, the positive 
relationship between cross-listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price should be more 
pronounced for financially constrained firms and firms located in countries with weak investor 
protection and low access to external financing.  
 
3. Sample data and variable construction 
3.1. Construction of cross-listing sample and country-level variables 
Following previous studies, the sample of international firms that are cross-listed in the U.S. 
and other overseas stock exchanges (such as the London Stock Exchange) is obtained from the 
primary depositary institutions, including Citibank, Bank of New York Mellon, J.P. Morgan, the 
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NYSE and the NASDAQ.
1
 The data consists of firms with ordinary listings on the U.S. stock 
exchanges or those listed as American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) with different types of 
listings: Level-1 ADRs listed on the OTC market, Level-2 and Level-3 ADRs listed on the 
NYSE/NASDAQ, and firms listed for private placements under Rule 144a. The data also 
includes the effective listing date for each cross-listed firm.
2
 The list is further supplemented by 
firms with direct listings on the two U.S. stock exchanges (NYSE/NASDAQ) according to their 
respective websites, as information about these listings might not have been available from the 
depositary institutions, particularly for cross-listed firms from Canada and Israel.  
Because firms could have had multiple listings, upgraded and downgraded their listing status 
or even been delisted due to mergers and acquisitions, their listing statuses as provided by 
Citibank are manually checked and verified with information from other sources such as Factiva 
and Lexis-Nexis. This procedure ensures that each cross-listed firm had only one type of cross-
listing in each year and that its effective cross-listing date reflects its latest listing status.   
Next, firm-level financial and return data are retrieved from Worldscope and Datastream 
(both provided by Thomson Reuters) and analyst coverage data is obtained from I/B/E/S. To be 
included in the sample, firms are required to have non-missing firm-year observations for their 
total assets, total sales, stock prices, market and book values of equity, and cash holdings. 
Following previous studies, firms operating in the financial (SIC codes between 6000 and 6999) 
and regulated (SIC codes between 9000 and 9999) industries, firms with negative total sales and 
book values of common equity and firms with book values of total assets less than US$10 
                                                 
1
These websites are www.adrbnymellon.com/home_dr.jsp (Bank of New York Mellon), 
wwss.citissb.com/adr/home/home.asp (Citibank); www.adr.com (J.P. Morgan); www.nyse.com (NYSE) and 
www.nasdaq.com (NASDAQ). 
 
2
 The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) imposes different requirements for the different types of cross-listed 
firms. Level-2 and Level-3 ADR firms are subject to more stringent rules and regulations, and Level-3 firms are 
allowed to raise capital on the U.S. exchanges. In general, the shares of these firms are traded more actively than 
those of Level-1 firms. 
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million are excluded from the sample. The industry classification follows that of Fama and 
French (1997). The cross-listing sample is then matched with the firm-specific financial 
variables and the final sample consists of an unbalanced panel of 119,726 firm-year observations 
for 17,120 firms in 41 countries. The sample period covers 1983-2007. Japan and the U.K. have 
the largest number of firms and firm-year observations, each with more than 1,700 firms and 
14,000 firm years. Colombia, Egypt and Sri Lanka have the smallest numbers, with fewer than 
25 firms and 150 firm-year observations. 
The sample firms are classified into cross-listed firms and benchmark firms (i.e., those that 
never cross-list on overseas exchanges). Panel A of Table 1 presents the distribution of firms 
(and firm-year observations) for each country in the sample. The sample comprises 1,176 cross-
listed firms (12,214 firm-year observations) and 15,944 benchmark firms (107,512 firm-year 
observations). Four dummy variables are created to denote the different listing types. Firms that 
are cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges are denoted as ADR firms. Likewise, firms that are traded 
on the OTC market (listed via private placements) are denoted as OTC (R144A) firms. The last 
category of firms, OTHERS, denotes firms that are cross-listed on other overseas stock 
exchanges. In the empirical analysis, the primary focus is on the sample of 486 ADR firms, 
although robustness tests are also conducted on the other cross-listed samples, including 465 
OTC firms, 203 R144A firms and 22 OTHERS firms.  
Panel A shows a substantial variation in the number of cross-listed firms in the international 
sample. Six countries (Colombia, Egypt, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Thailand) have no 
firms cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges, and three countries (Canada, Israel and the U.K.) have 
more than 50 ADR firms. India and Taiwan have the largest numbers of R144A firms (71 and 38 
firms, respectively) and are the two countries apart from Thailand with the highest numbers of 
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OTHERS firms.
3
 Finally, Australia, Hong Kong, Japan and the U.K. have the largest numbers of 
OTC firms, with more than 45 firms in each country.  
Panel B of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the country-level institutional 
variables that previous studies consider important for international studies. The variables include 
the access to equity market (ACCESS) and anti-self-dealing (ANTISELF) indices used by La 
Porta et al. (2006) and Djankov et al. (2008), and the legal origin (LO) dummy variable used by 
La Porta et al. (1997), which equals 1 for common-law countries and 0 for civil-law countries.
4
 
These country-level indices measure the extent of firms’ access to the capital market and legal 
protection in each country. Higher ANTISELF (ACCESS) index variables are indicative of 
stronger levels of investor protection and law enforcement effectiveness (i.e., a more accessible 
capital market). ACCESS is only available for 39 out of the 41 countries in the sample, and 
ranges from 2.78 (Colombia) to 6.43 (Netherlands) with a mean (median) value of 5.18 (5.29) 
and a standard deviation of 0.87.
5
 ANTISELF ranges from 0.17 (Mexico) to 1 (Singapore) with a 
mean (median) value of 0.52 (0.46) and a standard deviation of 0.24. Finally, 13 (28) out of the 
41 countries in the sample adopt the common (civil)-law legal tradition.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 The two notable exchanges apart from the U.S. exchanges are the London Stock Exchange and Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange.  
 
4
 Detailed descriptions of each index can be found in the respective papers. 
 
5
 Untabulated tests show that all of the correlations between the country-level indices are statistically significant at 
least at the 10% level, which confirms the findings of previous studies related to the high correlations among these 
institutional variables. 
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3.2. Research design and methodology  
The research design closely follows that of Almeida et al. (2004), Khurana et al. (2006) and 
Fresard (2012). To test H1, the baseline cash savings regression (equation (1)) is estimated using 
the ordinary least squares (OLS) model as follows: 
          
,
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                (1) 
where i and t represent firm i and time t, respectively. tiCASH ,  represents the cash holdings for 
firm i, calculated as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents to total assets (both at the end of year 
t). The dependent variable in equation (1) is tiCCASH , , which represents cash savings and is 
calculated as the ratio of the annual change in cash and cash equivalents for firm i from year t-1 
to t to total assets in year t.
6
 
As for the control variables, tiADR ,  is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is cross-listed 
on a U.S. exchange in year t and 0 otherwise. The lagged one-period value of ADR is used in 
equation (1). 1, tiCF  is the cash flow for firm i, calculated as the ratio of earnings before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization in year t to total assets in year t-1. Similar 
to prior studies (Baker et al., 2003; Chen et al., 2007), 1, tiQ  (the market-to-book-ratio for firm i 
at time t-1) is used as the main stock price measurement.
7
 The market-to-book ratio is calculated 
as the ratio of market value of equity (i.e., stock price multiplied by the number of shares 
                                                 
6
 Almeida et al. (2004) and Khurana et al. (2006) use total assets in year t as the denominator, and Fresard (2012) 
uses total assets in year t-1. According to unreported results (available upon request), all of the results are unchanged 
if the total assets in year t-1 is used as the denominator. 
 
7
 Biddle and Hillary (2006) argue that using the natural logarithm of the market-to-book ratio mitigates concerns 
related to the presence of outliers in a cross-country sample. McLean et al. (2012) use the same variable. In an 
unreported regression, Q is replaced by log(Q) and similar results are obtained. 
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outstanding) plus total assets minus book value of equity to total assets. tiSIZE ,  represents the 
firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets (in millions of U.S. dollars) in year t. 
In addition, the country ( cb ), industries ( jb ) and year ( tb ) dummies are included in equation (1) 
to control for the respective fixed effects. tiu ,  is an error term that is assumed to be independent 
of the explanatory variables. White’s heteroskedasticity-corrected robust standard errors, which 
are clustered by firm, are also estimated to mitigate the problems of serial auto-correlation and 
heteroskedasticity.  
The coefficients of Q and CF measure the cash savings sensitivities to stock price and cash 
flows, respectively. Recent studies have examined the determinants of these two coefficients 
(e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Khurana et al., 2006; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; Fresard, 2012). The 
main coefficient of interest in equation (1) is the interaction term between Q and ADR, 1b , which 
captures the incremental effect of the cross-listing decision on cash savings sensitivity to stock 
price. H1 predicts that this interaction coefficient is positive. In other words, cross-listing is 
expected to result in an incremental increase in cash savings sensitivity to stock price.   
 
3.3. Descriptive statistics of firm-specific variables 
In addition to the variables described earlier, several other firm-specific variables are 
calculated based on the Worldscope data. CAPEXR represents capital investment, calculated as 
the ratio of the sum of capital expenditures to total assets (both at the end of year t). ACQR 
represents acquisitions, calculated as the ratio of acquisitions to total assets (both at the end of 
year t). CNWC is the change in net working capital (current assets minus current liabilities), 
calculated as the ratio of the change in net working capital from year t-1 to t to total assets at the 
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end of year t. CSTD is the change in short-term debt, calculated as the ratio of the change in 
short-term debt from year t-1 to t to total assets at the end of year t.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics of the main firm-specific financial variables for the 
whole sample. On average, international firms hold about 15% of their assets (median = 10%) in 
the form of cash holdings, with a standard deviation of 0.19. The average firm’s cash savings are 
about 0.6% (median = 0.2%), with a standard deviation of 0.07. The interquartile range of cash 
saving is about 4.7% (2.9% minus -1.8%). These numbers are slightly higher compared with 
those found in a study by Khurana et al. (2006), where the mean cash holdings and cash savings 
are about 10% and 0.1%, respectively  
The average values of the market-to-book ratio and cash flows are 1.36 (median = 1.13) and 
12% (median = 11%), respectively. The corresponding standard deviations are 0.808 and 0.118, 
respectively. Moreover, the average capital investment and acquisition ratios are about 6% and 
1% (median = 4% and 0, respectively). The average changes in net working capital and short-
term debt are relatively small at 1% and 0 (matching the median values), respectively. Finally, 
the average firm size is about 20 (matching the median value), with a standard deviation of 1.72. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
4.  Empirical results and discussion 
4.1. The effect of cross-listing on cash savings sensitivity to stock price 
The first empirical task is to investigate how cross-listing influences cash savings sensitivity 
to stock price. The results of the equation (1) estimation are presented in Column (1) of Table 3 
and the evidence in Column (1) supports H1, as the interaction coefficient is positive (0.008) and 
statistically significant (t-statistic = 4.09) at the 1% level. In terms of economic magnitude, the 
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incremental increase in cash savings sensitivity to stock price for a cross-listed firm compared 
with that for a non-cross-listed firm is about 400% (four times).
8
 In addition, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the value of Q (0.808) increases the cash savings of a non-cross-listed firm 
by 0.2%. However, the corresponding cash savings increase of a cross-listed firm is 0.8%. This 
value represents about 130% of the average value of cash savings for the whole sample (0.006).
9
 
Therefore, the main finding reveals that cash savings are more responsive to changes in stock 
price for a cross-listed firm than for a non-cross-listed firm.     
Equation (1) is further estimated using various alternative regression specifications. First, 
because there is a great variation in the number of firm-year observations for the 41 countries 
used in the sample, Column (2) reports the results of the weighted least squares (WLS) 
methodology, where the weight is the inverse of the number of firms in each country. Second, 
Column (3) reports the results using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression 
methodology. Third, instead of using country fixed effects and clustering at the firm level, 
Columns (4) and (5) report the results using the firm fixed effects model to account for 
unobserved firm-specific variables that do not vary across time and using clustering at the 
country level, respectively.
10
 In general, the main finding of a positive relation between cross-
listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price persists in all of the specifications, with the 
magnitudes of the coefficient 1b  ranging from 0.008 to 0.015. 
                                                 
8
 The increase in the value of cash savings sensitivity to stock price = (0.008/0.002)  100 = 400%.  
 
9
 The calculation is as follows: the increase in cash savings for a non-cross-listed firm = b  std dev (Q) = 0.002  
0.808 = 0.2%. Meanwhile, the increase in cash savings for a cross-listed firm = (b+ 1b )  std dev (Q) = (0.002 + 
0.008)  0.808 = 0.8%. 
 
10
 Equation (1) is also estimated for the sample of ADR firms only, i.e., 486 firms and 4,977 firm-year observations. 
The results are unchanged. 
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In terms of the other control variables, the coefficients of Q and CF are both positive and 
statistically significant in most of the specifications, which is largely consistent with the findings 
of previous studies (e.g., Almeida et al., 2004; Khurana et al., 2006; Kusnadi and Wei, 2011; 
Fresard, 2012). These results imply that cash savings decisions are positively associated with 
cash flows and stock prices. The coefficient of ADR is negative and significant in all of the 
specifications, suggesting that the cross-listing decision leads to a decline in corporate cash 
savings. One possible explanation for this finding is that cross-listed firms are able to raise 
financing for their investment projects more easily, which lessens the need to save cash as a 
precaution. Meanwhile, the sign of the SIZE coefficient is positive and significant in three out of 
the five specifications.   
More relevantly, this study’s empirical evidence of a positive relationship between cross-
listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price logically ties up the various recent findings of 
the literature. The private information contained in stock prices has a positive effect on the 
sensitivity of corporate cash savings to stock price (Fresard, 2012). Because the stock prices of 
cross-listed firms are more informative (Fernandes and Ferreira, 2008), corporate cash savings of 
cross-listed firms should also be more responsive to changes in stock prices, which is the main 
finding of this study. Moreover, the allocation of cross-listed firms’ investment decisions is more 
efficient, as demonstrated by the higher sensitivities of investment to stock price (Foucault and 
Fresard, 2012). Therefore, as the savings are used to finance those more efficient investment 
decisions, the cash holdings of cross-listed firms are valued at a higher premium (Fresard and 
Salva, 2010). 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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4.2. Robustness tests  
In this sub-section, a series of sensitivity analyses are conducted to verify the robustness of 
the results. First, the cross-country and time-series variations in the relationship between cross-
listings and cash savings sensitivity to stock price are explored by estimating the baseline 
equation (1) country by country and year by year, and the results are reported in Figures 1 and 2, 
respectively. Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate substantial variations in the cash savings sensitivity to 
stock price values for the average firm (coefficient b, represented by the dark-grey bar) and an 
incremental increase in cash savings sensitivity to stock price values for the cross-listed firms 
(coefficient 1b , represented by the light-grey bar) for different countries and in different years. 
The values of coefficient b are relatively smaller (with a maximum value of 0.007) than that of 
coefficient 1b . However, the values of coefficient b increase in recent years (since 2003). Firms 
in Sri Lanka (Columbia) exhibit the highest (lowest) value of coefficient b, and cross-listed firms 
in Portugal (Peru) display the highest (lowest) value of coefficient 1b . On average, cross-listing 
decisions result in higher cash savings sensitivity to stock price sensitivities in 21 out of the 41 
countries and 19 out of the 25 years covered by the sample. 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 here] 
 
Second, changes in cash savings sensitivity to stock price influenced by the cross-listing 
decision are also examined. Seven event windows are constructed and the firms are classified 
into event year 0 for the year during which they were cross-listed on the U.S. exchanges. 
Consequently, the event year +n (-n) represents n years after (before) the firms were cross-listed. 
In total, the event time covers a period of seven years (three years before and three years after, 
including year 0). The interaction term ADRQ  is then excluded from equation (1) and the 
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modified equation for the seven event windows is estimated separately. Figure 3 portrays the 
evolution of cash savings sensitivity to stock price estimated for the seven event windows, 
together with the error bars that represent the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The values 
of the interaction term ADRQ  are small (and negative in event year -2) in the event years -1 to 
-3 (i.e., before the cross-listing). However, there is a sudden spike in the value of the interaction 
term, which increases substantially from 0.003 in year -1 to 0.026 in year 0. Although the values 
after the cross-listing (year +1 to +3) are smaller than that of year 0, they are still noticeably 
higher than those obtained before the cross-listing. Thus, Figure 3 offers evidence that is 
consistent with H1 in that the cash savings sensitivity to stock price increases for the cross-listed 
firms only after the cross-listing decision (event year 0) and not before.   
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
Third, additional variables are included in equation (1) and any possible endogeneity and 
self-selection bias is controlled for. The results are reported in Table 4. In Column (1) of Table 4, 
another interaction coefficient ( ADRCF  ) is included as an additional control variable in the 
estimation of equation (1). Cross-listing continues to have a positive effect on cash savings 
sensitivity to stock price despite the inclusion of the additional regressor. However, there is no 
evidence that cross-listing leads to a change in the cash-cash flow sensitivity, as the interaction 
coefficient ( ADRCF  ) is negative but statistically insignificant.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
In Column (2) of Table 4, lagged cash holdings (denoted as LCASHR) are included because 
a firm’s cash savings decisions are influenced by the initial availability of its cash (Fresard, 
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2012). In Column (3) of Table 4, Q is replaced by RATIO, which is calculated as the ratio of 
future investment (year t+1) to current investment (year t) (Almeida et al, 2004; Khurana et al, 
2006). Despite these changes, the interaction coefficient ADRQ  or ADRRATIO  retains its 
positive significance and the main finding is unchanged. 
Another important issue that arises is the potential endogeneity surrounding the cross-listing 
decision. Prior studies acknowledge this concern, and international firms with higher cash 
savings sensitivities to stock price may be more likely to cross-list on the U.S. exchanges. This 
would create a self-selection bias in the finding of a positive relation between cross-listing and 
the cash savings sensitivity to stock price. Moreover, cash savings decisions are simultaneously 
determined along with other important corporate decisions such as investments and leverage, 
which could also change due to cross-listing. 
Two alternative approaches are adopted to mitigate the concerns related to endogeneity and 
self-selection bias. First, this study follows those of Almeida et al. (2004) and Fresard (2012) by 
including several other variables that could also affect a firm’s cash savings decisions into the 
cash savings regression estimation, such as CAPEXR (capital expenditures), ACQR (acquisition), 
CNWC (change in net working capital) and CSTD (change in short-term debt). Moreover, 
because financing and investment decisions are endogenously determined, an IV estimation is 
implemented using the one- and two-period lagged values of fixed assets, acquisitions, net 
working capital, short-term debt and sales growth as the relevant instruments to estimate each of 
the four additional variables. The predicted values of the four variables are included as additional 
explanatory variables in the equation (1) estimation using the OLS regression model with 
country, industry and year fixed effects. As shown in Column (4) of Table 4, the coefficient 1b  
remains positive (magnitude = 0.006) and highly significant (t-statistic = 2.71) as expected. 
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 Second, a two-stage least squares regression (2SLS) methodology is implemented. In the 
first stage, a probit model of the cross-listing decision is estimated as follows: 
,
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    (2) 
where the dependent variable is the dummy variable ADR, which denotes the firms cross-listed 
on the U.S. exchanges. For each firm i, the following control variables are included. tiSIZE ,  
represents the firm’s size, calculated as the natural logarithm of its total assets at time t; tiLEV ,  
represents the firm’s leverage, calculated as the ratio of total debt to total assets at time t; 
)log( ,tiQ is the natural logarithm of Tobin’s Q at time t; tiROA ,  represents the firm’s return on 
assets, calculated as the ratio of its net income to its total assets at time t; and tiSALESG ,  
represents the firm’s sales growth, calculated as the percentage change in its sales from year t-1 
to year t. tjFINEXT ,_  is a variable taken from a study by Rajan and Zingales (1998). It 
measures the firm’s dependence on external finance, and is calculated as the mean ratio of the 
firm’s capital expenditures minus its cash flow from operations to the capital expenditures of all 
of the firms in each industry j at year t. In addition to the firm-level control variables, several 
country-level variables that may affect cross-listing decisions are included, where cLO  is the 
legal origin dummy variable for each country c, cJUDEFF _  is a variable taken from a study by 
La Porta et al. (2006) representing the efficiency of the judiciary index, cCIFAR  a variable taken 
from a study by La Porta et al. (1997) representing the accounting standards index and cLNGDP  
is a variable taken from a study by La Porta et al. (2006) representing the natural logarithm of the 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. 
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Equation (2) is estimated using the probit regression model with country, industry and year 
fixed effects. The results (unreported) reveal that large firms and firms with higher stock prices 
and profitability are more likely to cross-list on the U.S. exchanges. However, sales growth is 
negatively related to the decision to cross-list. The predicted values (lagged one period) from the 
probit model are subsequently obtained as instruments for the dummy variable ADR in 
estimating the second-stage regression, which is the cash savings regression (equation (1)). The 
inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from the probit regression is included in the modified equation (1) to 
correct for any self-selection bias in the second-stage regression using the Heckman (1979) 
correction model. The estimation results for the second-stage cash-savings regression using the 
Heckman model are presented in Column (5) of Table 4. The coefficient of the IMR is positive 
and statistically significant, confirming the presence of self-selection bias in the sample. 
Nevertheless, the interaction coefficient ADRQ  displays a positive association with cash 
savings (magnitude = 0.038 and t-statistic = 4.52). The main inference is unaffected, even after 
controlling for any possible endogeneity and self-selection bias. 
Fourth, the likelihood that certain countries or sample periods drive the results is controlled 
for, and the results are presented in Table 5. In Column (1) of Table 5, Japan and the U.K., which 
dominate the sample, are excluded to determine whether the main results hold. In Column (2) of 
Table 5, the years during which the Asian financial crisis and Internet bubble occurred are 
excluded, as a great variation in firms’ cash savings could be presented during those periods. 
Finally, the sample is partitioned into three periods, including 1983-1991, 1992-2001 and 2002-
2007 (which also correspond to the post-SOX periods), and the results are presented in Columns 
(3)-(5) of Table 5. In general, the main finding is not influenced by the two large countries in the 
sample or by specific events. However, it is interesting to note that the results are strongest in the 
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middle period (1993-2001) and that the coefficient of the interaction term becomes insignificant 
in the post-SOX period.
11
  
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Fifth, several recent studies have documented that country-level institutions are relevant to 
firms’ corporate policies. As a result, it is imperative to control for these effects in the regression 
specifications by including the additional interaction terms of Q with the country-level 
institutions and estimate equation (3) as follows: 
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     (3) 
where for country c, cZ  refers to a time-invariant measure of country-level institutions. All of 
the other variables are as defined earlier.  
Equation (3) is estimated using the OLS regression model with country, industry and year 
fixed effects and three different measures of country-level institutions (ACCESS, ANTISELF and 
LO). As shown in Table 6, the interaction coefficient ADRQ  continues to be positive and is 
statistically significant in all three of the specifications. This implies that cross-listing plays an 
incremental role in the cash savings sensitivity to stock price, even after controlling for the 
effect of country-level institutions. Meanwhile, the interaction coefficient ZQ  is positive and 
statistically significant (at the 5% level) only for ACCESS. The other interaction coefficient 
ZCF   is negatively and statistically significant in all three of the specifications. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
                                                 
11
 In particular, cross-listed firms must disclose more public information during the post-SOX period due to the 
more stringent disclosure requirements, which increase the costs associated with cross-listing. 
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4.2. Controlling for different types of cross-listing 
In addition to ADR firms, it is necessary to investigate whether different types of cross-listing 
have similar effects on the cash savings sensitivity to stock price. The findings of Fernandes and 
Ferreira (2008) suggest that other listing types (i.e., OTC and R144A) are less important than 
exchange listings (ADR) in driving firms’ return variations. From these findings, the effects of 
other listing types (including listings on other overseas stock exchanges) on cash savings 
sensitivity to stock price are expected to be smaller than those observed for an exchange listing 
and may even be insignificant. 
Equation (1) is modified by replacing the interactions of Q and CF with ADR with their 
respective interactions with the other three listing types (OTC, R144A and OTHERS). The 
modified equation is estimated using the OLS regression model with country, industry and year 
fixed effects. The results in Table 7 are consistent with the conjecture. None of the three listing 
types displays positive and significant cash savings sensitivity after cross-listing, as revealed in 
Columns (1)-(3) of Table 7.
12
 In Column (4) of Table 7, when all four types of cross-listings on 
the U.S. exchanges are included, only the ADR firms display higher cash savings sensitivity to 
stock price after cross-listing. 
 [Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.3 Cross-sectional variations  
There are three competing explanations for the positive relationship found between cross-
listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price: the agency channel, access to external 
financing channel and the managerial learning channel. In this subsection, further tests are 
conducted to examine the validity of each explanation. 
                                                 
12
 Cash savings are marginally negatively associated with stock price for firms listed under Rule 144A.  
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The first explanation is taken from a study by McLean et al. (2012). As mentioned earlier, if 
the finding is driven by the agency channel, the positive association between cash savings and 
stock price should be more prominent for cross-listed firms in countries with weaker legal 
protection, as these firms are likely to suffer from agency-related problems before cross-listing. 
To test this proposition, the same two measures of country-level institutions (ANTISELF and 
LO) used in Table 6 are used as proxies for investor protection, and the sample is partitioned into 
Low and High ANTISELF subsamples for index values below and above the median value, 
respectively. For LO, the sample is partitioned into Common-Law and Civil-Law countries. 
Equation (1) is then re-estimated for each of these subsamples using the OLS regression model 
with country, industry and year fixed effects to determine whether they exhibit differing 
relationship between cross-listing and cash savings sensitivity to stock price. 
The findings are presented in Table 8. The interaction coefficient ADRQ  is found to be 
positive and significant only for the subsample of firms with high self-dealing indices (Column 
(2)) and common-law legal traditions (Column (4)). In addition, the difference in the interaction 
coefficient )( ADRQ  between the Low (Civil Law) and High (Common Law) ANTISELF 
subsample is negative and significant (at the 5% level) for both country-level institutional 
variables. This is inconsistent with the agency channel explanation. Therefore, the main finding 
cannot be attributed to an improvement in the legal protection and disclosure environment of 
cross-listed firms. 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
The second explanation is access to external financing channel, as cross-listed firms are less 
constrained when accessing external financing to fund their investments. One country-level 
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variable (ACCESS) and two firm-level variables (CHSIZE and CHDIVP) are used as measures of 
access to external finance. CHSIZE represents the change in size from year t-1 to year t. 
CHDIVP represents the change in dividend payout, calculated as the ratio of the change in cash 
dividends to net income from year t-1 to year t. Similar to the two other measures of investor 
protection, countries are further classified as Low or High ACCESS if their index values are 
below or above the median value, respectively. Columns (5) and (6) of Table 8 report the 
estimation results of equation (1) with country, industry and year fixed effects for the two 
subsamples based on ACCESS. Although the magnitude of the interaction coefficient ADRQ  
is positive and significant in both Low and High ACCESS countries (Columns (5) and (6)), the 
difference in the interaction coefficient ADRQ  between the Low and High ACCESS countries 
is not significant (p-value = 0.84).  
For the firm-level measures, this study follows Foucault and Fresard (2012) in classifying 
each cross-listed firm into two groups: Low or High if its CHSIZE (and CHDIVP) value in year t 
is below or above the median value, respectively, of cross-listed firms for the year. If the change 
in firm size or dividend payout ratio is small, these firms are considered financially constrained, 
as they lack the means to access the external financing necessary to fund their investments. 
However, if the change in firm size or dividend payout ratio is large, these firms are considered 
financially unconstrained. 
The interaction terms LowQ  and HighQ  are then included into equation (1) and the 
modified equation is re-estimated with country, industry and year fixed effects. The results are 
presented in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9. The interaction coefficients LowQ  and HighQ  
are positive and statistically significant in both columns. More relevantly, the differences in the 
coefficients are negative and significant for CHSIZE. For the external financing channel 
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argument to be valid in the cross-listing context, the cash savings sensitivity to stock price should 
be higher for financially-constrained firms than for unconstrained firms, as the former are 
generally more constrained in accessing the equity market to finance their investments. This is 
again contrary to the results in Columns (1) and (2) of Table 9. It can be inferred from the cross-
sectional analysis that access to an external financing channel is probably not driving the positive 
association between cross-listing and the cash savings sensitivity to stock price. 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
The third and final explanation is the managerial learning channel. To examine whether this 
study’s results are consistent with this explanation, the sample is partitioned into two groups for 
each cross-listed firm based on the analyst coverage (ANALYST) and firm-specific stock return 
variation (RV) in each year.
13
 ANALYST is calculated as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of analysts following the firm in year t. The analyst following value is set at 0 if it is 
missing. RV is calculated as the logarithmic transformation of (1- R
2
/ R
2
), where R
2
 is the 
determination coefficient obtained from the cross-sectional regression of monthly individual 
stock returns on the monthly local and U.S. market returns. Once again, a cross-listed firm is 
classified as Low or High if its ANALYST or RV value in year t is below or above the median 
value, respectively, of cross-listed firms for the same year.  
Columns (3) and (4) present the results of the modified equation (1) after including the 
interaction terms LowQ  and HighQ , based on ANALYST and RV, respectively. If the 
managerial learning channel explanation is valid, the interaction coefficient HighQ  should be 
                                                 
13
 Fernandes and Ferreira (2008) find that cross-listing indeed helps improve firm-specific return variation as 
measured by RV. However, they argue that an increased analyst following does not encourage the production of 
firm-specific information, as analysts typically produce information that is publicly available in the market. 
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higher (lower) than LowQ  for RV (ANALYST). In other words, the cash savings of cross-listed 
firms with RV (ANALYST) values above (below) the median are expected to respond more 
significantly to changes in stock price than their counterparts with RV (ANALYST) values below 
(above) the median. This is indeed reflected in the results shown in Columns (3) and (4). For RV, 
the magnitude of the interaction coefficient HighQ  (0.013) is significantly higher than that of 
LowQ  (0.009) and the difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.02). In contrast, the 
opposite is true for ANAYST. The increase in the cash savings sensitivity to stock price for cross-
listed firms can be attributed to the higher return variation (lower analyst coverage) of these 
firms compared with that of the non-cross-listed firms, which supports H2a. Therefore, the 
managerial learning channel is probably driving the positive relation between cross-listing and 
cash savings sensitivity to stock price. 
In summary, the findings from the cross-sectional tests suggest that as the stock prices of 
cross-listed firms convey more private information, they should reflect more innovations in 
investment opportunities. Consequently, managers’ cash savings decisions are more responsive 
to changes in the stock prices for cross-listed firms than for non-cross-listed firms. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper evaluates how cross-listing decisions affect the relationship between cash savings 
and stock price. The main finding is that cross-listed firms display higher cash savings sensitivity 
to stock price than their non-cross-listed counterparts. This finding is robust to alternative 
regression specifications, samples, types of cross-listing, and even after controlling for possible 
endogeneity and self-selection bias.  
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Additional cross-sectional analysis reveals that the positive association between cross-listing 
and cash savings sensitivity to stock price is more prominent for cross-listed firms with more 
informative stock prices. This evidence strengthens the notion that the mechanism driving the 
higher cash savings sensitivity to stock price is the managerial learning channel.  
In conclusion, this paper provides corroborating evidence that helps to explain the cross-
country differences in the determinants of cash savings decisions. Cross-listing is one major 
factor that allows international firms allocate their capital to investment projects more efficiently. 
As a result, firms’ cash savings decisions are also more sensitive to changes in stock prices. 
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Appendix 
Definitions of main variables 
 
Variable name Definition Source 
Country-level variables 
ACCESS Access to external equity index. La Porta et al. (2006) 
ANTISELF Anti self-dealing index. Djankov et al. (2008) 
LO Legal origin dummy variable that equals 1 for common-law 
countries and 0 for civil law countries. 
La Porta et al. (1997) 
Firm-level variables 
ADR A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. 
stock exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an American 
Depository Receipt and 0 otherwise. 
Various sources including the 
websites of Bank of New York, 
Citibank, NYSE, NASDAQ, 
etc.  
OTC A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross-listed on the 
U.S. OTC (over-the-counter) market and 0 otherwise. 
 
R144A A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross-listed in the 
U.S. market via Rule 144A (private placement) and 0 otherwise. 
 
OTHERS A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is cross-listed on other 
overseas (non-U.S.) stock exchanges (i.e. London Stock 
Exchange, Luxembourg Stock Exchange, Singapore Stock 
Exchange, etc.) and 0 otherwise. 
 
CASHR Cash holdings, calculated as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents 
to total assets. 
Worldscope 
CHCASH Change in cash holdings, calculated as the ratio of the annual 
change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total 
assets at the end of year t. 
Worldscope 
Q  Tobin’s Q, calculated as market value of equity plus total assets 
minus book value of equity divided by total assets. 
Worldscope 
CF Cash flow, calculated as income before extraordinary items plus 
depreciation and amortization divided by total assets. 
Worldscope 
CAPEXR Capital investment, calculated as the ratio of capital expenditures 
to total assets. 
Worldscope 
ACQR Acquisitions, calculated as the ratio of acquisitions to total assets.  Worldscope 
CNWC Change in net working capital, calculated as the ratio of the 
change in net working capital from year t-1 to year t to total assets 
at the end of year t. 
Worldscope 
CSTD Change in short-term debt, calculated as the ratio of the change in 
short-term debt from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of 
year t. 
Worldscope 
SIZE The natural logarithm of total assets (in USD millions). Worldscope 
CHSIZE The change in SIZE from year t-1 to year t. Worldscope 
CHDIVP Change in dividend payout, calculated as the change in the ratio 
of cash dividends to net income from year t-1 to year t. 
Worldscope 
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ANALYST Analyst coverage, calculated as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the 
number of analysts following the firm in year t. The value for 
analyst following is set at 0 if it is missing.  
I/B/E/S 
RV Firm-specific return variation, calculated as the logarithmic 
transformation of (1- R
2
/ R
2
), where R
2 
is the coefficient of 
determination obtained from the cross-sectional regression of 
monthly individual stock returns on monthly local and U.S. 
market returns.  
Datastream 
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Figure 1 
Country-by-country estimates of the cash savings sensitivity to stock price 
 
 
 
This figure presents the estimates of the cash savings sensitivity to stock price from the OLS regression of equation (1) as performed country-by-country, using 
industry and year fixed effects. The dark-grey bar represents the values of the coefficient b, while the light-grey bar represents the values of the coefficient b1. 
The sample period is from 1983 to 2007. 
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Figure 2 
Year-by-year estimates of the cash savings sensitivity to stock price 
 
 
 
This figure presents the estimates of the cash savings sensitivity to stock price from the OLS regression of equation (1) as performed year-by-year, using country 
and industry fixed effects. The dark-grey bar represents the values of the coefficient b, while the light-grey bar represents the values of the coefficient b1. The 
sample period is from 1983 to 2007.  
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Figure 3 
Cash savings sensitivity to stock price in event time surrounding the cross-listing year 
 
 
 
This figure presents the estimates of the cash savings sensitivity to stock price (and the 95% confidence interval) from the OLS regression of equation (1) for 5 
years before and after the cross-listing year (year 0) using country and industry fixed effects.  
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Table 1 
Sample distribution 
 
Panel A: Distribution of cross-listed firms 
   Number of firms Number of firm-years 
Country # Firms 
# Firm-
Years ADR R144A OTC OTHERS Benchmark ADR R144A OTC OTHERS Benchmark 
ARGENTINA 59 387 8 2 1 0 48 85 17 5 0 280 
AUSTRALIA 768 4,063 15 3 53 0 697 199 37 441 0 3,386 
AUSTRIA 96 797 1 1 11 0 83 5 20 105 0 667 
BELGIUM 126 1,063 1 0 1 0 124 25 0 2 0 1,036 
BRAZIL 229 1,409 22 5 18 0 184 179 24 150 0 1,056 
CANADA 1,078 6,727 91 0 0 0 987 882 0 0 0 5,845 
CHILE 128 1,089 10 1 2 0 115 124 1 13 0 951 
COLOMBIA 20 147 0 2 0 0 18 0 10 0 0 137 
DENMARK 159 1,543 2 0 5 0 152 40 0 38 0 1,465 
EGYPT 18 60 0 5 0 0 13 0 22 0 0 38 
FINLAND 135 1,279 4 1 3 0 127 43 11 34 0 1,191 
FRANCE 785 6,122 23 3 19 0 740 259 22 353 0 5,488 
GERMANY 703 6,092 15 3 22 0 663 179 33 333 0 5,547 
GREECE 212 734 1 4 1 0 206 7 21 8 51 647 
HONG KONG 661 4,226 12 2 66 0 581 66 9 722 0 3,429 
INDIA 503 3,040 9 71 6 17 400 72 567 58 0 2,343 
INDONESIA 211 1,415 2 0 1 0 208 21 0 12 0 1,382 
IRELAND 66 661 8 0 7 0 51 95 0 69 0 497 
ISRAEL 117 532 52 1 0 0 64 228 2 0 0 302 
ITALY 270 2,121 7 6 8 0 249 100 66 93 6 1,856 
JAPAN 3,391 26,388 25 1 47 0 3,318 431 11 785 0 25,161 
KOREA(SOUTH) 871 4,921 7 18 2 1 843 51 200 21 0 4,649 
MALAYSIA 736 4,805 0 0 7 0 729 0 0 86 0 4,719 
MEXICO 109 789 24 6 22 0 57 197 54 176 0 362 
NETHERLANDS 205 1,999 20 1 10 0 174 236 1 120 0 1,642 
NEW ZEALAND 96 574 3 0 1 0 92 28 0 20 0 526 
NORWAY 168 1,184 4 0 4 0 160 25 0 57 0 1,102 
PAKISTAN 88 695 0 3 0 0 85 0 17 0 0 678 
PERU 52 340 1 2 1 0 48 11 22 6 0 301 
PHILIPPINES 105 735 1 4 6 0 94 17 51 68 0 599 
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PORTUGAL 72 467 2 2 2 0 66 18 21 14 0 414 
SINGAPORE 475 2,821 3 0 13 0 459 12 0 154 0 2,655 
SOUTH AFRICA 284 2,296 13 4 31 0 236 154 48 340 24 1,730 
SPAIN 163 1,443 2 3 3 0 155 41 12 52 0 1,338 
SRI LANKA 18 111 0 1 0 0 17 0 11 0 0 100 
SWEDEN 297 2,103 8 1 8 0 280 72 8 138 0 1,885 
SWITZERLAND 214 2,110 7 1 4 0 202 84 25 55 0 1,946 
TAIWAN 1,173 4,993 7 38 2 4 1,122 58 313 16 0 4,606 
THAILAND 351 2,289 0 1 11 0 339 0 11 115 0 2,163 
TURKEY 168 964 1 6 0 0 161 5 44 0 0 915 
UK 1,740 14,192 75 1 67 0 1,597 928 15 771 0 12,478 
TOTAL 17,120 119,726 486 203 465 22 15,944 4,977 1,726 5,430 81 107,512 
Panel B: Descriptive statistics for country-level variables 
COUNTRY ACCESS ANTISELF LO 
ARGENTINA 3.23 0.34 0 
AUSTRALIA 6 0.76 1 
AUSTRIA 4.89 0.21 0 
BELGIUM 5.7 0.54 0 
BRAZIL 4.05 0.27 0 
CANADA 6.39 0.64 1 
CHILE 4.8 0.63 0 
COLOMBIA 2.78 0.57 0 
DENMARK 5.87 0.46 0 
EGYPT 5.2 0.2 0 
FINLAND 6.37 0.46 0 
FRANCE 5.75 0.38 0 
GERMANY 5.93 0.28 0 
GREECE 5.28 0.22 0 
HONG KONG 5.5 0.96 1 
INDIA 5.3 0.58 1 
INDONESIA 4.53 0.65 0 
IRELAND 5.29 0.79 1 
ISRAEL 5.35 0.73 1 
ITALY 4.41 0.42 0 
JAPAN 4.92 0.5 0 
KOREA(SOUTH) 5.02 0.47 0 
MALAYSIA 5.11 0.95 1 
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MEXICO 3.9 0.17 0 
NETHERLANDS 6.43 0.2 0 
NEW ZEALAND 5.82 0.95 1 
NORWAY 5.57 0.42 0 
PAKISTAN . 0.41 1 
PERU 3.84 0.45 0 
PHILIPPINES 4.62 0.22 0 
PORTUGAL 4.5 0.44 0 
SINGAPORE 5.5 1 1 
SOUTH AFRICA 5.94 0.81 1 
SPAIN 5.09 0.37 0 
SRI LANKA . 0.39 0 
SWEDEN 6.15 0.33 0 
SWITZERLAND 6.07 0.27 0 
TAIWAN 5.54 0.56 0 
THAILAND 4.24 0.81 1 
TURKEY 5.03 0.43 0 
UK 6.26 0.95 1 
Mean 5.18 0.52 0.32 
Median 5.29 0.46  
Std Dev 0.87 0.24 0.47 
 
Panel A of this table presents the distribution of cross-listed firms for each country in the sample. Panel B of this table presents the summary-statistics for the 
country-level variables. Firms are either cross-listed on the U.S. exchange (ADR), listed via private placements (R144A), over the counter (OTC), on other 
overseas exchanges (OTHERS). ACCESS is the ease of access to external equity market index from La Porta et al. (2006). ANTISELF is the anti self-dealing 
index from Djankov et al. (2008). LO is the legal origin dummy variable, which equals one for common-law countries, and zero for civil-law countries from La 
Porta et al. (1997). The sample consists of 41 countries from 1983 to 2007. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of firm-level variables 
 
Variable        N Mean Median Std Dev 25th 75th 
CASHR 119,726 0.149 0.096 0.194 0.038 0.194 
CHCASH 119,726 0.006 0.002 0.071 -0.018 0.029 
Q 119,726 1.363 1.126 0.808 0.917 1.504 
CF 119,726 0.121 0.114 0.118 0.060 0.176 
CAPEXR 119,726 0.056 0.041 0.055 0.018 0.074 
ACQR 119,726 0.008 0.000 0.031 0.000 0.000 
CNWC 118,275 0.010 0.009 0.100 -0.032 0.052 
CSTD 112,562 0.001 0.000 0.072 -0.020 0.026 
SIZE 119,726 19.534 19.363 1.719 18.264 20.656 
 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of the main firm-level variables for the pooled sample. All variables are 
as defined in the appendix. The sample consists of 41 countries from 1983 to 2007. 
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Table 3 
Cross-listings and corporate cash savings 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Country FE WLS FM Firm FE Country Cluster 
CF 0.121*** 0.129*** 0.131*** 0.178*** 0.121*** 
 (37.50) (26.77) (24.26) (35.89) (13.98) 
Q 0.002*** 0.000 0.001 -0.002*** 0.002* 
 (5.46) (0.26) (1.31) (-3.26) (2.01) 
ADR -0.015*** -0.024*** -0.021*** -0.025*** -0.015*** 
 (-4.52) (-4.43) (-3.24) (-3.72) (-4.17) 
QADR 0.008*** 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.009** 0.008*** 
 (4.09) (4.08) (3.06) (2.54) (4.16) 
SIZE 0.000 0.001*** 0.000** 0.009*** 0.000 
 (0.74) (3.39) (2.26) (12.77) (0.33) 
      
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
      
N 119,726 119,726 119,726 119,726 119,726 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.059 0.042 0.195 0.053 
 
This table presents the coefficients of cash savings regressions. The dependent variable is CHCASH. ADR is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as 
an American Depository Receipt in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. CHCASH is calculated as the ratio of the change in 
cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of year t-1. All other variables are as 
defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by firm. t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4 
Alternative specifications 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Include 
CFADR 
Include 
LCASHR 
Replace Q by 
RATIO 
IV Heckman 
CF 0.121*** 0.115*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.131*** 
 (37.10) (34.15) (41.02) (31.03) (35.90) 
Q 0.002*** 0.007***  -0.001 0.002** 
 (5.41) (15.26)  (-1.37) (2.41) 
RATIO   0.002***   
   (16.11)   
ADR -0.014*** -0.013*** 0.001 -0.012*** -0.072*** 
 (-3.64) (-3.41) (0.18) (-3.11) (-3.39) 
CFADR -0.013  -0.035*   
 (-0.77)  (-1.88)   
QADR 0.008*** 0.009***  0.006*** 0.038*** 
 (4.16) (3.72)  (2.71) (4.52) 
RATIOADR   0.005***   
   (3.13)   
LCASHR  -0.113***    
  (-36.64)    
CAPEXR    0.187***  
    (13.81)  
ACQR    0.405***  
    (15.30)  
CNWC    -0.105***  
    (-6.90)  
CSTD    -0.154***  
    (-4.95)  
IMR     0.022*** 
     (3.47) 
SIZE 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000*** -0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (3.52) 
      
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 119,726 119,726 101,930 80,791 80,791 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.088 0.061 0.060 0.060 
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This table presents the coefficients of cash savings regressions for different alternative specifications. The 
dependent variable is CHCASH. ADR is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an American Depository Receipt in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. CHCASH is 
calculated as the ratio of the change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of 
year t-1. LCASHR is calculated as the ratio of cash and cash equivalents in year t-1 to total assets at the end of year t. 
RATIO is calculated as the ratio of capital expenditures in year t+1 to the corresponding value in year t. CAPEXR is 
calculated as the ratio of capital expenditures in year t to total assets at the end of year t. ACQR is calculated as the 
ratio of acquisitions in year t to total assets at the end of year t. CNWC is calculated as the ratio of the change in net 
working capital from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of year t. CSTD is calculated as the ratio of the 
change in short-term debt from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of year t. IMR is the inverse mills ratio 
obtained from the first-stage regression of determinants of cross-listings decisions. All other variables are as defined 
in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 5 
Alternative samples and time-periods 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Exclude  
Japan & U.K. 
Exclude 
1997-2000 
1983-1991 1992-2001 
Post-SOX 
(Year >= 2002) 
CF 0.119*** 0.121*** 0.133*** 0.129*** 0.110*** 
 (32.51) (34.43) (13.87) (24.50) (23.91) 
Q 0.002*** 0.003*** -0.002 -0.000 0.005*** 
 (3.99) (5.65) (-1.24) (-0.21) (7.05) 
ADR -0.019*** -0.012*** -0.016** -0.020*** -0.011*** 
 (-5.11) (-3.32) (-2.01) (-3.48) (-2.63) 
QADR 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.010* 0.013*** 0.003 
 (4.41) (3.00) (1.84) (3.46) (1.29) 
SIZE 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000** -0.000 
 (2.77) (0.22) (2.66) (2.00) (-1.37) 
      
Country FE Yes Yes Yes No No 
Year FE Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
N 79,146 99,084 12,621 45,255 53,479 
Adj. R-squared 0.049 0.053 0.057 0.061 0.046 
 
This table presents the coefficients of cash savings regressions for alternative samples and time-periods. The 
dependent variable is CHCASH. ADR is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an American Depository Receipt in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. CHCASH is 
calculated as the ratio of the change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of 
year t-1. All other variables are as defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, 
clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 6 
Controlling for country-level institutions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ACCESS ANTISELF LO 
CF 0.226*** 0.144*** 0.143*** 
 (9.31) (16.69) (32.95) 
Q -0.005 0.004*** 0.002*** 
 (-1.52) (3.29) (3.67) 
ADR -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 (-4.40) (-4.59) (-4.71) 
QADR 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (3.90) (4.14) (4.19) 
QZ 0.001** -0.002 0.000 
 (2.15) (-1.15) (0.49) 
CFZ -0.019*** -0.036*** -0.041*** 
 (-4.23) (-2.72) (-6.53) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.76) (0.75) (0.80) 
    
Country FE Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
    
N 118,920 119,726 119,726 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.0554 
 
This table presents the coefficients of cash savings regressions after controlling for country-level institutions. The 
dependent variable is CHCASH. ADR is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an American Depository Receipt in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. CHCASH is 
calculated as the ratio of the change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of 
year t-1. ACCESS is the ease of access to external equity market index from La Porta et al. (2006). ANTISELF is the 
anti self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008). LO is the legal origin dummy variable from La Porta et al. (1997); 
which equals one for Common law countries, and zero for Civil law countries. All other variables are as defined in 
the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 7 
Different types of cross-listings 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OTC R144A OTHERS All Listings 
CF 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 (37.32) (37.39) (37.37) (37.49) 
Q 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (6.26) (6.41) (6.35) (5.48) 
ADR    -0.015*** 
    (-4.53) 
OTC -0.001   -0.001 
 (-0.25)   (-0.46) 
R144A  0.007*  0.006* 
  (1.95)  (1.65) 
OTHERS   0.007 0.001 
   (1.11) (0.20) 
QADR    0.008*** 
    (4.05) 
QOTC -0.000   -0.000 
 (-0.19)   (-0.03) 
QR144A  -0.005*  -0.005* 
  (-1.88)  (-1.88) 
QOTHERS   -0.004 0.001 
   (-0.81) (0.14) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.66) (0.50) (0.43) (0.97) 
     
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 119,726 119,726 119,726 119,726 
Adj. R-squared 0.052 0.052 0.052 0.053 
 
This table presents the coefficients of cash savings regressions for the different types of cross-listings. The 
dependent variable is CCASH. ADR is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock 
exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an American Depository Receipt in year t-1, and zero otherwise. OTC is a 
dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on the U.S. OTC (over-the-counter) market in year t-1, 
and zero otherwise. R144A is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed in the U.S. market via 
Rule 144A (private placement) in year t-1, and zero otherwise. OTHERS is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
firm is cross-listed on other overseas (non-U.S.) stock exchange (i.e. London Stock Exchange, Luxembourg Stock 
Exchange, Singapore Stock Exchange, etc) in year t-1, and 0 otherwise. CHCASH is calculated as the ratio of the 
change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of year t-1. All other variables 
are as defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by firm. t-statistics are 
reported in the parentheses. 
 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 
Controlling for cross-sectional variations in country-level institutions 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Low 
ANTISELF 
High 
ANTISELF 
Civil 
Law 
Common 
Law 
Low 
ACCESS 
High 
ACCESS 
CF 0.137*** 0.116*** 0.142*** 0.106*** 0.132*** 0.117*** 
 (22.02) (30.90) (32.42) (22.97) (27.34) (28.53) 
Q 0.001 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (1.35) (5.31) (4.04) (3.21) (2.60) (4.24) 
ADR -0.003 -0.019*** -0.006 -0.023*** -0.015** -0.017*** 
 (-0.69) (-4.52) (-1.37) (-4.49) (-2.14) (-4.12) 
QADR 0.000 0.010*** 0.002 0.011*** 0.009* 0.008*** 
 (0.12) (4.38) (0.86) (4.33) (1.80) (3.75) 
SIZE 0.001*** -0.000 0.000** -0.000* -0.000 0.000 
 (4.30) (-1.38) (2.54) (-1.93) (-0.05) (0.23) 
       
p-value of 
difference in 
QADR 
(0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.84) 
 
(0.02) 
 
       
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
N 30,605 89,121 72,778 46,948 51,910 67,010 
Adj. R-squared 0.063 0.051 0.068 0.040 0.066 0.047 
 
This table presents the coefficients of investment regressions after controlling for cross-sectional variations in 
country-level institutions. The dependent variable is CHCASH. ADR is a dummy variable which equals one if a firm 
is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an American Depository Receipt in year t, 
and zero otherwise. CHCASH is calculated as the ratio of the change in cash and cash equivalents from year t-1 to 
year t to total assets at the end of year t. ANTISELF is the anti self-dealing index from Djankov et al. (2008). LO is 
the legal origin dummy variable from La Porta et al. (1997); which equals one for Common law countries, and zero 
for Civil law countries. ACCESS is the ease of access to external equity market index from La Porta et al. (2006). 
Countries are classified into Low (High) ACCESS or ANTISELF if the index value is above the median value. All 
other variables are as defined in the Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by firm. 
t-statistics are reported in the parentheses. 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 9 
Controlling for cross-sectional variations in firm-level financial constraints and information environment 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 CHSIZE CHDIVP ANALYST RV 
CF 0.120*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 0.121*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Q 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
ADR -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
QLOW 0.006*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
QHIGH 0.014*** 0.012*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
SIZE 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
     
p-value of:  
QLOW - QHIGH  
(0.00) (0.18) (0.03) (0.02) 
     
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
N 119,726 119,726 119,726 119,726 
Adj. R-squared 0.053 0.053 0.053 0.053 
 
This table presents the coefficients of cash savings regressions after controlling for cross-sectional variations in 
firm-level financial constraints and information environment. The dependent variable is CHCASH. ADR is a dummy 
variable which equals one if a firm is cross-listed on a U.S. stock exchange (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ) as an 
American Depository Receipt in year t, and zero otherwise. CHCASH is calculated as the ratio of the change in cash 
and cash equivalents from year t-1 to year t to total assets at the end of year t. LOW (HIGH) is a dummy variable 
which equals one in year t for a cross-listed firm if the value for each of the partitioning variable (CHSIZE, CHDIVP, 
ANALYST, or RV) is below (above) the median value calculated for all cross-listed firms. CHSIZE is the change in 
SIZE from year t-1 to year t. CHDIVP is calculated as the change in the ratio of cash dividends to net income from 
year t-1 to year t. ANALYST is the natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts following a firm in year t. 
RV is the logistic-transformed firm-specific return variation in year t. All other variables are as defined in the 
Appendix. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity, clustered by firm. t-statistics are reported in the 
parentheses. 
*
 denotes statistical significance at the 10% level. 
  
**
 denotes statistical significance at the 5% level. 
  
***
 denotes statistical significance at the 1% level. 
  
 
 
